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ARGUMENT 
I BECAUSE JOEL FAILED TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION THAT FRED, AS 
TITLE HOLDER, OWNED THE RANCH PROPERTY, THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED TEAT THE RANCH PROPERTY WAS A 
PARTNERSHIP ASSET. 
Joel argues that, because a partnership agreement to hold 
land as a partnership asset need not be in writing, the trial 
court properly determined that the ranch was a partnership asset. 
(Joel's Brief at 26. J1 As described below, however, Joel failed 
to rebut the presumption that Fred, as the holder of title to the 
property, owned the property at his death. 
A. .Tnp-L Fail*"* «•" Rebvf the Presumption that Fred, as 
TiMsholder, Owned <-** Property. 
Under the general rule in the jurisdictions, Fred's holding 
of title to the ranch property created a presumption that Fred 
owned the property. See Alan R. Bramberg & Larry E. Ribstein, 1 
Bramberg and Ribstein on Partnership, § 3.02(d) (3), at 3:20 
(Supp. 1998); 59 Am. Jur.2d Partnership § 373 (1987). Although 
the presumption of individual ownership may be rebutted by a 
clear showing of the parties' intent to include the property as a 
partnership asset, "this intent must include the intent of the 
titleholder of the property involved." Mischke v. Mischke, 530 
1
 The opening brief of the Appellants/Daughters will be 
referred to as the "Daughters' Brief." 
N.W.2d 235, 240 (Neb. 1995). "Use of the property alone is not 
sufficient because an owner may intend to contribute only the 
use, as distinguished from the ownership, to the partnership." 
Id. 
Here, Fred's actions during his lifetime do not reflect his 
intent that the ranch property belong to the partnership. Only 
Fred held title to the property and claimed deductions for 
depreciation on the property. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 27; R. 282, 
pg. 42.) Fred, his estate, or his heirs have paid all property 
taxes, which totaled over $20,000. (Id. at 38, 139, 179, 194.) 
Although Fred's affidavit stated that a partnership was buying 
the property, the affidavit was required under federal law to 
complete the purchase of the land. (Id. at 92-93; Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 3 0.) 
Joel argues that he and Fred's "business decision" to title 
the property in Fred's name did not alter their intent to include 
the ranch property as a partnership asset. (Joel's Brief at 31.) 
Joel testified that Fred decided to put the ranch in Fred's name 
to protect the property against creditors in case Joel got into 
trouble. (R. 282, pgs. 93-94.) Fred's decision to hold title 
individually for creditor protection, however, suggests that: he 
2 
intended to own the land himself and merely allow the partnership 
to use the land for cattle ranching. Indeed, Fred's actions 
compel the same conclusion reached in Mischke: the partnership 
between Joel and Fred merely enjoyed the use, rather than the 
ownership, of the ranch property. See 530 N.W.2d at 240. The 
evidence of Fred's alleged intent that the partnership own the 
property is not sufficiently clear to rebut the legal presumption 
that Fred, as the titleholder, owned the property. See 
Pendleton v. Strange, 381 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964). 
Thus, this Court should reject the trial court's conclusion that 
the property is a partnership asset, and reverse the judgment of 
the trial court. See Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-5 (1998) . 
B T^ ^* Event «-^ g Court Reverses the Trial Court's 
.•mxrrrn^* that tho V^rh P-nDertv is a Partnership 
Aflfiftfc. tb-J° Pnurt S*»»-M Rg-iect Joel's Request ror 
T?Pveraa3 ^ fhe J^CTflnt Regarding the Corner Parcel. 
Joel argues that, if this Court reverses the trial court's 
judgment regarding ownership of the property, this Court should 
also "reverse the trial court's determination that the corner 
parcel . . . was partnership property." (Joel's Brief at 32.) 
This Court, however, will not reverse "on errors claimed for the 
first time on appeal." Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n, 
461 P.2d 290, 293 n.2 (Utah 1969). At trial, Joel testified that 
if a partnership did not exist, then he was entitled to the 
comer property.2 (R. 282, pg. 65.) Joel maintained at trial 
that he "purchased the [corner] property with his own funds and 
intended it to be a part of his contribution to a land-and-cattle 
partnership." (Joel's Brief at 32.) Thus, because Joel's 
argument regarding the corner parcel was not preserved below, 
this Court should refuse to address it. See id. 
In any event, even assuming that Joel preserved the issue 
below, reversal of the trial court's judgment regarding the 
corner parcel would require a cross-appeal of that issue. Joel's 
cross-appeal, however, is limited to the issue of labor as a 
capital contribution. In State v. South, 924 P.2d 354 (Utah 
1996) , the supreme court established that it is the "result" or 
"outcome" of a trial court's judgment or decision that requires a 
cross-appeal. Id. at 357. 
In this case, reversal of the trial court's judgment 
regarding the corner property would change the ultimate outcome 
2
 Joel argues, without citation to the record, that the 
trial court's decision regarding the corner parcel was premised 
on its finding that the ranch property was a partnership asset. 
(Joel's Brief at 13 n. 3.) To the contrary, the trial court ruled 
that "[t]he testimony was that [the corner parcel] was part of 
the partnership. He was purchasing it for the partnership." (R. 
282, pg. 209.) 
4 
or result of the court's decision: the corner parcel would no 
longer be deemed a partnership asset. The effect of this Court's 
reversal on ownership of the corner property would be to enlarge 
Joel's rights and lessen the Daughters' rights. That result 
requires a cross-appeal of the issue. See id. at 355-56. Thus, 
in the event this Court reverses the trial court's judgment 
regarding the ranch property, it should reject Joel's invitation 
to consider issues related to the corner property because those 
issues are not properly before this Court on appeal. 
II BECAUSE JOEL FAILED TO PRESENT CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE 
THAT FR'D TENDED TO GIVE AND IRREVOCABLY DELIVERED TO JOEL 
ON^ " HALF 0' ETS CAPITAL CONTRIBUTION, THIS COURT SEOULD 
REVERSE TEE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT REGARDING THE GIFT. 
Joel argues that clear and convincing evidence supports the 
trial court's determination that Fred made a legal gift to Joel 
of one half of his capital contribution. (Joel's Erief at 34-
35.) Joel quotes portions of Lovezz v. Continental Bank & Trust 
Co., 4 Utah 2d 76, 286 P.2d 1065 (1955), arguing that "'it rests 
primarily with the trial court to determine whether the evidence 
is clear and convincing."' Id. at 1068 (citation omitted). The 
remainder of the quoted statement, however, emphasizes that the 
trial court's ''finding is not necessarily conclusive." Id. 
The Lcvetz court discussed at length the heightened standard 
governing appellate review of the trial court's determination of 
whether "clear and convincing" evidence was presented at trial: 
11 ?
 the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding should 
be considered by the appellate court in the light of [the "clear 
and convincing" evidence standard].'" id. (citation omitted). 
The court stated that "where a higher degree of evidence is 
required to establish a fact a proportionately greater degree of 
proof is required to sustain a finding of the existence of such 
fact." id. Regarding the quantum of proof necessary to meet the 
standard, the supreme court stated that "clear and convincing 
evidence" approaches the criminal standard of "proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt."3 Id. at 1067; see also Jardine v. Archibald, 
3 Utah 2d 88, 279 P.2d 454, 457 (1955) ("'Clear and convincing 
evidence clinches what might be otherwise only probable to the 
mind.'" (citation omitted)). In view of the Lovett standard of 
appellate review, this Court will not, as in the typical case, 
affirm the judgment if any evidence exists to support the trial 
3
 Joel suggests that, under Lovett, undisputed collateral 
evidence is sufficient to support a finding of an inter vivos 
gift. (Joel's Brief at 34.) Lovett, however, does not support 
that assertion. In its decision, the Lovett court relied in part 
on direct evidence in the form of statements made by the decedent 
clearly expressing donative intent. See 286 P. 2d at 1068. 
6 
court's judgment. Rather, "[i]t requires a higher degree cf 
proof to sustain a finding of fact which must be established by 
'clear and convincing evidence' . . . than where mere proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence is sufficient." Lovett, 286 P.2d 
at 1067. 
A. The Evidence Before the Trial Court Does Not "Clinch" 
the Finding that Fred Intended to Give to Joel One Half 
of His Capital Contribution, 
Joel correctly notes that, to find an inter vivos gifc, the 
trial court must find the following elements by clear and 
convincing evidence: donative intent, irrevocable delivery, and 
accepcance. (Joel's Brief at 35.) The burden of persuasion on 
these elements rests with Joel, "as the claiming donee." Sims v. 
George, 466 P.2d 831, 933 (Utah 1970) . The courts recognize a 
clear distinction between the lay definition of a "gift" and the 
legal standard for finding a valid gift inter vivos. See Scto v. 
First Gibraltar Bank, FSB San Antonio, 868 S.W.2d 400, 403-04 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that, although the alleged doners 
believed, in lay terms, that a valid gift had been mace, the gift 
was legally insufficient because the donors retained the right to 
revoke the gift). 
Citing West v. Nest, 16 Utah 2d 411, 403 P.2d 22 (1963), 
7 
Joel argues that his family relationship with Fred is a 
"significant" factor in determining the validity of the gift. 
(Joel's Brief at 35.) West, however, states only that a trial 
court may place "some reliance on the fact that it is natural to 
make a gift to a member of one's family." id. at 25 (emphasis 
added). Standing alone, the family relationship is insufficient. 
Joel goes on to highlight the trial court's finding that Fred and 
Joel developed a close relationship, while "Fred's relationship 
with his heirs was estranged and lacked any contact."4 (Joel's 
Brief at 36.) Joel himself, however, testified that Fred's 
relationship with his children had nothing to do with this case. 
(R. 282, pgs. 58-59.) 
Citing Sims, Joel further points to Fred and Joel's 
friendship as evidence supporting a gift. In Sims, however, the 
donor had written a note expressly stating his delivery of 
certain shares of stock as a gift. 466 P.2d at 832. The supreme 
court noted that the friendship existing between the donor and 
Joel also points to the trial court's references regarding 
his credibility as a witness at trial. (Joel's Brief at 35.) 
Although Joel correctly notes that credibility is a determination 
for the trial court, even taking Joel's testimony at face value 
fails to establish the necessary- evidence to support che trial 
court's "gift" determination. 
8 
donee was consistent with the jury's finding of a gift. Id. 
Joel relies heavily on evidence before the trial court 
supporting Joelfs assertion that Fred contributed money to the 
cattle business in an efforc to help Joel in his future career. 
(Joel's Brief at 37-38.) Even assuming, however, that Fred's 
primary motivation for entering into the cattle operation was to 
help Joel establish a career, an assumption not truly supported 
by the evidence,5 that evidence merely reflects Fred's motivation 
to contribute to the business. Significantly, Joel testified as 
follows regarding Fred's participation in the business: "If it 
wasn't a good deal for Fred, do you think he would have did iu? 
No. It was a beneficial deal for both of us. (R. 282, pg. 183.) 
(Emphasis added.) Fred's contribution of money to the business 
to help Joel get started in his ranching career simply does not 
5
 Joel testified that Fred had told him "with your ycuth ana 
my wisdom and age and cold hard cash on the corner of the casle, 
there isn't nothing we can't do." (R. 282, pg. 148.) (Empnasis 
added.) Fred also told Joel that they were "together" on 
purchasing the property. (Id. at 35-36.) Significantly a: the 
becinning of their business relationship when ooel uola rrsa the. 
he^had boucht a cow, Fred's "eyes kind of lit up." (Id. a: 9.) 
When Joel isked Fred if he wanted io "get into it" [tne 
i TT-r-^ri M I H "VPS " (Td.) Their cattle business gave business], Fred saia yeb . v-^-; ^ ^ 
Fred "somethina to wake up in the morning for. . . . r.e couia 
think about things, plan things out. It gave him, you Knew, 
thouchts again." (Id- at 183.) 
9 
"clinch" an otherwise "probable" finding that Fred intended to 
make a legal gift to Joel of one half of his capital 
contributions. Jardine, 279 P. 2d at 457.6 Because the evidence 
does not show that it is "highly probable" that Fred intended to 
give one half of his contributions to Joel, the trial court erred 
in its finding. Lovett, 286 P.2d at 1067. 
B. Joel Failed to Meet His Burden to Establish that Fred 
Irrevocably Parted With and Gave Up All Control Over 
One Half of His Capital Contribution. 
Joel contends that Fred's retention of one half of the 
capital contributions distinguishes the facts of this case from 
those cited in the Daughters' Brief. (Joel's Brief at 3 8.) 
Although the court found that Fred gave Joel only one half of his 
capital contribution, (R. 255), Fred was still required to 
irrevocably part with the portion given to Joel such that 
delivery of the fifty-percent interest reached the "'point of no 
return.'" In re Lefrak, 215 B.R. 930, 934 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) 
(citation omitted) (stating that donor alleged to have given a 
fifty-percent interest in certain real property was required to 
"surrender dominion and control irrevocably to the donee"), 
6
 As noted in the Daughters' Brief, Fred did not file any 
gift tax return. See Burnett v. Burnett, 471 S.E.2d 649, 651 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that "whether a gift tax return was 
filed" is "evidence relative to donative intent"). 
10 
aff'd, 1998 WL 809527 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) . Indeed, the donee must 
part with "present and future dominion and control over [the 
gift] beyond any power on his part to recall." Dial v. Dial, 603 
So. 2d 1020, 1023 (Ala. 1992) (emphasis added). 
Fred's retention of title to the entire property does not 
show an irrevocable delivery of one half of the property to Joel. 
(R. 282, pg. 37.) Fred did not claim deductions for depreciation 
on only one half of the property or losses on feed; he claimed 
deductions for the entire property and all losses. (Jd. at 42; 
Plaintiffs? Exhibit 17-13.) Fred, his estate, or his heirs have 
paid all the property taxes. (R. 232, pgs. 38, 139, 179, 194.) 
See Estate of Kennedy v. May, 318 N.Y.S.2d 759, 761 (App. Div. 
1971) (affirming finding of no gifc because alleged donor 
"continued to pay taxes, insurance, maintenance and improvements 
to the property"). 
Joel suggests, however, that Fred and Joel's "purposeful 
business decisions" surrounding tide, tax returns, and property 
taxes "dispel any inferences contrary" to a gifn. (Joel's Brief 
at 39.) To the contrary, that the decisions were "business" 
related dispels all inferences supporting the trial court's gift 
determination. Fred did not irrevocably deliver one half of his 
11 
contribution to Joel; he contributed the money to the cattle 
business. (See Daughters' Brief, at 28-31.) The evidence does 
not show that Joel could reasonably have taken "his" half of the 
contribution and used it in any manner at his discretion, an 
inference that must be supported by the evidence if Fred 
irrevocably parted with all dominion over one half of the assets. 
Indeed, Joel himself testified that he treated Fred's cash 
contributions as "business" funds, carefully avoiding commingling 
of business and personal funds in the Key Bank checking account. 
(R. 282, pg. 45.) 
At most, Joel presented some evidence consistent with the 
trial court's finding of a gift. (See Joel's Brief at 35-38; 
Daughter's Brief at 27-28.) Joel failed, however, to meet his 
burden of persuasion in presenting clear and convincing evidence 
of the elements of an inter vivos gift. See Lovett, 286 P. 2d at 
1067; Sims, 466 P.2d at 833. For these reasons, this Court 
should reverse the judgment of the trial court finding that Fred 
made an inter vivos gift to Joel of one half of his capital 
contributions. 
12 
III. BECAUSE THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT JOEL'S ASSERTED THEORIES 
OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND IMPLIED AGREEMENT AS ALTERNATIVE 
GROUNDS FOR AFFIRMING TEE GIFT DETERMINATION, THIS COURT 
SHOULD REFUSE TO AFFIRM ON EITHER OF THESE GROUNDS. 
In the event this Court reverses the judgment of the trial 
court on the gift issue, Joel offers the theories of promissory 
estoppel and implied agreement as alternative grounds for this 
Court to affirm the trial court's judgment awarding one half of 
the partnership assets to the Daughters and one half to Joel. 
(Joel's Brief at 40.) Joel did not argue either of these 
theories at trial.7 Although the supreme court has held that an 
appellate court may affirm on grounds not argued below, it 
recently has noted that "our previous opinions on that question 
have been somewhat inconsistent." South, 924 P.2d at 355 n.3. 
Similarly, this Court has refused to consider alternative grounds 
for affirmance that were not argued before the trial court:. See 
Werner-Jacobs en v. Bednarik, 945 P. 2d 744, 748 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997) . 
Should this Court reach the merits of the alternative 
7
 Joel did argue that, in the event the trial court did not 
find that a partnership existed, he should be compensated for the 
reasonable value of his services under a contract implied in law 
(guancum meruit). (R. 124-25.) As discussed below, however, 
Joel's present argument: amouncs to a request for this Court to 
find a contract implied in fact governing disposition of the 
assets uoon dissolution of the partnership. 
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grounds, however, affirmance on either of these grounds is 
improper because the elements of these theories are not 
"'apparent on the record.'" State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145, 149 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997). In Montoya, this Court recognized that, 
"[i]f, in any way, the ground or theory urged for the first time 
on appeal is not apparent on the record, the principle of 
affirming on any proper ground has no application." Id. 
(emphasis in original). "[T]he record must contain sufficient 
and uncontroverted evidence supporting the ground or theory to 
place a person of ordinary intelligence on notice that the 
prevailing party may rely thereon on appeal." Id. at 149-50 
(emphasis added). Thus, for this Court to affirm on either of 
the asserted grounds, the elements of promissory estoppel or 
implied agreement must be apparent on the record and supported by 
"sufficient and uncontroverted evidence." Id. 
A. The Evidence Does Not Establish the Elements of 
Promissory Estoppel. 
The elements of promissory estoppel are as follows: (1) a 
promise "'reasonably expected to induce reliance,'" (2) 
reasonable reliance "'inducing action or forbearance on the part 
of the promisee or a third person,'" and (3) detriment "'to the 
promisee or third person.'" Andreason v. Aezna Cas. & Sur. Co., 
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848 P.2d 171, 174-75 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citation omitted). 
Because evidence supporting these elements is not apparent on the 
record, this Court should reject Joel's arguments regarding 
promissory estoppel. 
! T^O v.-viAen«o noes Not Reflect A Definite and 
retain P~™^» >>v Fred that Joel's Labor Would Be 
^ i „ ^ Equally with Fred's Money Contributiong. 
Joel argues that Fred and Joel's "agreement" to build a 
business out of money and labor is "essentially" a promise by 
Fred that Joel's labor would receive equal treatment with Fred's 
money. (Joel's Brief at 41-42.) The "promise" under promissory 
estoppel, however, must be "sufficiently definite and certain 
that the plaintiff acting as a reasonable and prudent person 
under the circumstances would be justified in placing reliance 
thereon." Petty v. Gindy Mfg. Corp., 17 Utah 2d 32, 404 P.2d 30, 
32 (1965). Joel's argument that Fred "essentially" and 
"implicitly" made a promise that labor equals money dispels the 
conclusion that the alleged promise was sufficiently definite or 
certain to induce reasonable reliance. See id. 
Joel relies on his testimony that "the agreement" between he 
and Fred was that "he was financing it and I was doing the work." 
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(R. 282, pg. 85. ) 3 That testimony, however, reflects only an 
agreement, made at some unidentified time, regarding the identity 
of the contributions to be made by each partner. It does not, 
with sufficient certainty, reflect a promise by Fred that Joelfs 
labor would be treated as equivalent to Fred's money 
contributions. See Petty, 404 P. 2d at 32; see also Rose v. 
Allied Develop. Co., 719 P.2d 83, 87 (Utah 1986) (discussing 
prior decision in which court refused to imply a promise in 
employment contract "to which the employer had not expressly 
agreed" (emphasis added)). Also, Joel does not explain how 
Fred's "horror stories about lawyers" amounted to a promise that 
Joel's labor would equal Fred's capital contributions. Although 
Joel argues that Fred led him to believe that his "ownershio 
rights were secure," he identifies no specific promise that 
"ownership rights" meant an equalization of labor and monev at 
the time of dissolution of the partnership. The evidence cited 
Joel further relies on his "understanding" that Fred "was 
supplying the money and some of the wisdom, and I was supolying 
my youth and my ability to get things done." (R. 282, pg. 148.) 
This testimony of Joel's subjective understanding, however, does 
not establish Fred's assent to the terms of the promise alleged 
by Joel. See Rose v. Allied Develop. Co., 719 P. 2d 83, 87 (Utah 
198 6) (stating that promissory estoppel requires more than 
"subjective understanding" of alleged promisee) . 
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by Joel simply fails to establish the first element of promissory 
estoppel. 
2. Joel Has Failed to Establish that the Alleged 
Promise Induced Reasonable Reliance On His Part. 
Even assuming that Fred made the promise as Joel alleges, 
Joel cannot show reasonable reliance induced by the promise. 
"'Damages in promissory estoppel are limited to those which are 
sustained because the plaintiffs have changed their position to 
their detriment in reasonable reliance upon the defendant's 
representations. '" Andreason, 848 P.2d at 175-76 (emphasis 
added) (citation omitted). 
As noted above, Joel does not identify when Fred allegedly 
promised him that Joel's labor would equal Fred's money 
contributions. (R. 282, pgs. 73-74, 85, 148.) On these grounds 
alone, Joel has failed to establish that Fred's alleged promise 
induced him to detrimentally rely on the promise. Also, even if 
Fred's comments about attorneys could somehow be construed as a 
promise to Joel that his labor equaled Fred's money, Joel's 
testimony that "I was really very dumb not: to go hire an 
attorney" confirms his own belief than reliance on the alleged 
promise was not: reasonable. {Id. a: 102.) Joel himself admitted 
that he really "wasn't locking for legal advice." {Id.) 
The record further establishes that it was Joel who bought 
the first cow and that Joel asked Fred whether he would like to 
"get into it." {Id. at 9.) Finally, Joel cannot argue that 
Fred's ambiguous statement not to "worry" about his kids caused 
Joel to incur injury. {Id. at 55-56.) The record establishes 
only that this conversation took place "[a]fter the land was 
purchased." {Id.) The record is unclear whether the 
conversation took place before Joel expended the efforts he now 
claims were induced by reliance on Fred's alleged promise. 
Because, on the record before the trial court, Joel cannot 
establish reasonable reliance that resulted from a clear promise 
made by Fred that labor would be treated equally with money, this 
Court should reject Joel!s arguments regarding promissory 
estoppel. 
B. The Record Contains No Grounds To Affirm the "Gift" 
Determination on the Basis of An Implied Contract 
Overcoming the Presumptions of the Uniform Partnership 
Act, 
Joel argues that this Court may affirm the trial court's 
determination regarding disposition of assets on the basis of an 
implied contract between Fred and Joel that altered the statutory 
presumptions set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-37 (1998). Joel 
cites Petersen v. Petersen, 169 N.W.2d 228 (Minn. 1969), in which 
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the trial court found an implied agreement between partners that, 
upon dissolution, each was entitled to receive one half of the 
assets and profits. See id. at 230. The court noted that, 
although such agreements need not be in writing, they must be 
established by reference to the law governing contracts implied 
in fact. See id. 
In Utah, " [a] contract is express or implied by reason of 
the expression of offer and acceptance, -- whether there is a 
manifestation of mutual assent, by words or actions or both, 
which reasonably are interpretable as indicating an intention to 
make a bargain with certain terms or terms which reasonably may 
be made certain." Rasmussen v. United States Steel Co., i Utah 
2d 291, 265 P. 2d 1002, 1004 (1954) (emphasis added) . The supreme 
court has rejected a finding of implied contract when there was 
"no evidence of any action or conduct that reasonably could be 
construed as a manifestation of mutual assenc indicating an 
intention to be bound on a contract whose terms were certain." 
Fowler v. Taylor, 554 P.2d 205, 208 (Utah 1976).9 
9
 More recent Utah decisions on contracts implied in fact 
set forth three necessary elements: "(I) the defendant requested 
the plaintiff to perform work; (2) the plaintiff expected the 
defendant to compensate him or her for those services; and (3) 
the defendant knew or should have known that the plaintiff 
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Joel argues that the "record unequivocally demonstrates" 
that his labor would be equal to Fredfs money. (Joel's Brief at 
43.) Without record support, Joel makes the assertion that 
"[w]hatever they gave was immediately equal." (Id.) To the 
contrary, however, Joel cites no evidence in the record showing 
Fred's assent "indicating an intention to be bound on a contract" 
containing the "certain" term that all assets and profits were to 
be divided equally upon dissolution of the partnership. Fowler, 
554 P.2d at 208. Because Fred's assent to a binding contract on 
the terms alleged by Joel is not "apparent on the record," this' 
Court should reject Joel's arguments. Montoya, 937 P.2d at 149. 
In view of the standard applied to the determination of 
implied contracts, the cases cited by Joel are unhelpful. In 
Kuhl v. Gardner, 894 P.2d 525 (Or. Ct. App. 1995), the defendant 
did not dispute that the plaintiffs were entitled to one half of 
the partnership assets and profits. See id. at 532. Only the 
timing and conditions of the distribution were at issue. See id. 
In Citizens Bank of Clovis v. Williams, 630 P. 2d 1228 (N.M. 
expected compensation." Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987). To the extent that this test applies here, Joel 
does not argue that the record supports a finding of chese 
elements. 
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1981), the trial court found a valid "oral" agreement, unlike the 
alleged implied agreement here, that all assets were to be 
divided equally upon dissolution. Id. at 1229. Neither of the 
cases analyzed the "agreement" in the light of principles similar 
to those governing implied contracts under Utah law. The cases 
and the evidence on the record simply do not support a 
determination that Fred and Joel entered into a binding contract 
sufficient to rebut the presumption, set forth in section 48-1-
37, that Fred was entitled to a return of his capital 
contributions. For these reasons, this Court should refuse to 
affirm the trial court's judgment on grounds of an implied 
contract. 
IV. BECAUSE JOEL HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH TEAT THE TRIAL COURT 
CLEARLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT JOEL'S LABOR WAS NOT A CAPITAL 
CONTRIBUTION, THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT JOEL'S REQUEST TO 
AFFIRM ON THESE GROUNDS. 
Joel has cross-appealed the trial court's finding that 
Joel's labor did not constitute a capital contribution. (Joel's 
Brief at 47.) Joel asks this Court to address the cross-acpealed 
issue, however, only if the Court reverses on the gift issue. 
(Id.) Thus, Joel does not seek to enlarge the rights aranced to 
him by the trial court, see South, 924 P. 2d at 355-56, but 
asserts the cross-appealed issue only to preserve the result 
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obtained at trial. For the reasons set forth below, Joel has 
failed to carry his burden on appeal to show the error of the 
trial court's finding. 
A. Joel Has Failed to Marshal the Evidence 
Supporting the Trial Court's Determination 
That Joel and Fred Did Not Agree to Treat 
Joel's Labor As a Capital Contribution. 
Joel asserts that, because the trial court's decision on 
this point "came from reading the case law cited" by the parties, 
the trial court's decision is purely a question of law requiring 
no marshaling of the evidence. (Joel's Brief at 48.) To the 
contrary, the trial court stated that "[i]n this situation I 
think both of them participated in the partnership, as should 
most partners. That should be the participation. However as I 
have considered the case, I now find that the labor of Joel did 
not constitute a capital contribution." (R. 282, pgs. 204-05.) 
(Emphasis added.) 
Indeed, the very cases relied upon by Joel state that the 
determination of whether an agreement exists to treat labor as 
capital is a finding of fact. See Schymanski v. Conventz, 674 
P. 2d 281, 285 (Alaska 1983) (remanding for "additional findings" 
on whether partners agreed to treat personal services as a 
capital contribution) . The only principle of law stated in the 
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cases considered by the trial court is that, absent an agreement 
to the contrary, the labor or personal services of a partner is 
not a capital contribution. See, e.g., id. Thus, in rejecting 
Joel's arguments, the trial court implicitly "found" that Fred 
and Joel did not agree to treat Joel's labor as capital. See 
Mower v. McCarthy, 122 Utah 1, 245 P.2d 224, 227 (1952) (" [W] e 
assume that the trial court found the facts in accord with its 
decision in all cases where under the evidence it could 
reasonably so find."). The trial court's label of this 
determination as a "conclusion of law" is not binding on this 
Court. See Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 453 (Utah 1993) ("On 
appeal, we disregard the labels attached to findings and 
conclusions and look to the substance."). 
Under these circumstances, Joel was required to marshal the 
evidence supporting the trial court's finding and show that, even 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court, the 
evidence is insufficient to support the finding. See Bailey-
Allen Co. v. Kurzet, 945 P.2d 180, 186 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Because Joel makes no attempt to marshal the evidence supporting 
the trial court's finding that Joel and Fred did not agree to 
treat labor as a capital contribution, this Court should refuse 
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to consider the merits of his cross-appeal. 
B. Even On The Merits, Joel's Cross-Appeal Should Be 
Rejected Because The Record Reflects Neither An 
Agreement That Joel's Labor Would Be Treated As a 
Capital Contribution Nor An Undisputed Value of Joel's 
Services. 
Should this Court proceed to the merits on this issue, 
however, Joel's arguments fail because the record does not 
support the existence of an agreement to treat Joel's labor as a 
capital contribution. Joel's actions in failing to keep records 
of time worked or demanding wages, however, do not reflect his or 
Fred's understanding that Joel was to receive capital credit for 
services rendered to the partnership. (R. 282, pg. 55.) 
Significantly, the trial court made no findings regarding the 
value of Joel's services and the Daughters questioned the 
accuracy of Joel's "estimate" on the value. (Id. at 70-75.)10 
In view of the lack of evidence supporting the existence of an 
agreement to treat labor as a capital contribution, and the 
10
 The case law cited by Joel is distinguishable. In 
Eardley v. Salmons, 8 Utah 2d 159, 330 P.2d 122 (1958), the 
partners clearly provided that the defendant was to receive a 
certain amount as wages for services rendered to the partnership. 
Id. at 123. In Farris v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 222 
F.2d 320, 322 (10th Cir. 1955), the parties had prepared a 
written partnership agreement that clearly set forth the value of 
the partner's personal services and contemplated the treatment of 
labor as a capital contribution. 
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existence of conflicting evidence on the value of Joel's 
services, this Court should refuse to affirm the judgment on the 
alternative grounds that Joel's labor was a capital contribution. 
See Montoya, 937 P.2d at 149. 
CONCLUSION 
The Daughters respectfully request that this Court reverse 
the judgment of the trial court determining that Fred and Joel 
entered into a partnership. In the alternative, the Daughters 
request reversal of the judgment on grounds that the ranch 
property was not a partnership asset. Finally, even assuming 
that Fred and Joel entered into a partnership that included the 
property, this Court should reverse the judgment on grounds that 
Fred did not make a legally valid gift to Joel of one half of his 
capital contributions. The case should then be remanded with 
instructions to award to the Daughters the full value of Fred's 
capital contributions. 
DATED this 10th day of December 1998. 
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